“With the dynamic changes taking place throughout the Asia-Pacific, Japan will likely never have the same opportunity to help guide the fate of the region. In choosing leadership, Japan can secure her status as a tier-one nation and her necessary role as an equal partner in the alliance.”~ “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia”(2012)

Two towering figures in American foreign policies, Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, passed away in the spring of 2025. Since 2000, Armitage and Nye have co-authored a series of the bipartisan “Armitage-Nye Report”. In the latest and last report in April 2024, they urged the U.S.-Japan alliance to seek security cooperation with Australia and the Philippines, hold the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan trilateral security dialogue, and support Taiwan in strengthening resilience in critical infrastructure.

In the beginning, the authors define China as a “revisionist”, who adopts tools of coercion to claim territories and pursue national interests. At the same time, both the U.S. and Japan strive to design new polices to stage strategic competition with China. Washington’s “small yard, high fence” policy doctrine seeks to check the diffusion of America’s critical technologies into China and accelerate the diversification in global supply chains. Tokyo seeks to support domestic firms against supply chain disruptions and protect sensitive technologies through government oversight and a new system of secret patents.  

Given the pressing challenges ahead, the authors deem it urgent to rebuild a more integrated U.S.-Japan alliance on military, economic, and strategic fronts. On the military front, Washington and Tokyo should strengthen deterrence capacity, facilitate joint decision-making, and repair systematic crevices. On the economic front, Washington and Tokyo should work together to guard critical technologies and promote friend-shoring. On the strategic front, Washington and Tokyo should push for the “de-risking” with China through bilateral or multilateral mechanisms. The relevant policy measures cover three main areas: advancing the security alliance, expanding partnerships and coalitions, and strengthening economic and technology cooperation.

How to advance the security alliance? The first step is to restructure alliance command and control. The U.S. Forces Japan should establish a new three-star or four-star command structure, which corresponds to Japan Self Defense Forces’ newly-established Joint Operational Command (J-JOC) in operational planning and execution. Under this new command structure, Washington and Tokyo should set up a standing office in charge of combined planning and coordination of military operations. The second step is to strengthen the intelligence relationship and cyber-security. The U.S. should promote bilateral intelligence-sharing modeled by the Five Eyes alliance. Japan should centralize its intelligence gathering under the Cabinet Secretariat, which should have access to all information on national security. Besides, Japan should strengthen security clearance, boost cyber defense, and promote information sharing regarding cyber threats. The third step is to prioritize defense industry and technology cooperation. The U.S. should enhance collaboration with Japan on licensed munitions production and new technology development. The U.S. should also encourage Japan to collaborate with AUKUS allies under Pillar Two and partner with foreign defense corporations.

How to expand partnerships and coalitions? The authors call on Japan and South Korea to make a joint security declaration to establish a bilateral defense partnership. Security cooperation with Australia should be incorporated into the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S. and Japan should support the Philippines in its confrontation with China in the South China Sea, and provide the Filipinos with security assistance to ensure interoperability. Regarding Taiwan, Tokyo should be included in regular security dialogues between Washington and Taipei. To prepare for a Taiwan Strait contingency, Washington and Tokyo should help Taiwan to solidify its critical infrastructure in transportation, communication, and energy supplies. In the Middle East, the U.S. should urge Japan to make use of its SDF facilities in Djibouti to defend commercial sea lanes in the Red Sea. Moreover, the U.S. and Japan should collaborate with the Quad, G7 and South Korea to counter Beijing’s co-option and disinformation to strengthen democratic resilience and rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region.

How to strengthen economic and technology cooperation? The U.S. and Japan should take the lead in encouraging other G7 countries to enhance resilience in supply chains and critical infrastructure. To counter China’s excess capacity and dumping, the U.S. and Japan should work with like-minded partners to devise collective policy responses, including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. The U.S. and Japan should work together to explore new ideas in forward-looking free trade agreements, which address pressing issues in economic coercion, supply chain resilience, and advanced technology standards. Both governments should seek to deepen existing trade agreements in strategic sectors, such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, lithium batteries, and critical minerals. To provide alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the U.S. and Japan could make concerted efforts to advance energy security and youth leadership in sub-Saharan Africa, enliven economic opportunities and sustainable development in Latin America, and accelerate the adoption of mobile telecommunication technology in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Washington and Tokyo should expand regular dialogue mechanisms by incorporating economic security issues in industrial policy, export controls, and technology promotion.

Finally, the authors express some worry over the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. During recent years, the educational exchanges between the two countries have kept declining. The authors strongly suggest both governments work closely with the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON), cultivate the next generation of American and Japanese leaders, and revitalize bilateral relationships across civil society, industry, and government.

Taking Taiwan into China’s fold and overtaking the U.S. as the global dominant power has been the strategic goal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. As 2027, the year in which a PLA invasion into Taiwan might occur, is approaching, the time is running short not only for Taiwan, but also for the U.S. and Japan. Co-located on the First Island Chain, Japan and Taiwan face the same threat and, in some sense, share the same destiny. It is absolutely imperative for the leaders of the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan to stop PLA from penetrate through the First Island Chain. Perhaps the best counter strategy is to found a trilateral U.S.-Japan-Taiwan alliance.  To make that happen demands creativity, courage and decisiveness from President Trump, Prime Minister Ishiba, and President Lai.

The article is based on Center for Strategic and International Studies’ “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2024: Toward an Integrated Alliance”, authored by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye. Read the full report