“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” ~Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”.
The true reality of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been highly evasive for the outside world. Ever since its founding in 1929, the PLA has habitually kept its strategies as well as its strength in secret. Mao Zedong’s top guideline has always been deception at all costs, for foes or friends alike. What does the PLA really look like behind this wall of deception? Timothy R. Heath, a PLA expert at RAND Corporation, takes a domestic-politics perspective to cast doubt on PLA’s readiness for combat missions.
The PLA’s first and foremost mission has always been, and will always be, Dr. Heath claims, “upholding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule rather than preparing for war.” History shows that PLA’s strategic priorities and modernization paces have been primarily guided by political considerations, which value loyalty more than merits. The so-called “the People’s army” is truly “the Party’s army.” This fundamental nature will only grow more deep-rooted, as CCP is obliged to put in more efforts to quell civil unrest amid China’s deteriorating economy and divisive society.
During the Sino-Japanese War, the PLA showed more willingness to steal the National Army’s recruits and ammunitions than to fight the Japanese. The victory in the Chinese Civil War further justified PLA’s leading role in combating domestic threats. After the Korean War, CCP was faced with internal power struggle and political sabotage among different power groups and ideological factions. Following the adage of “Power grows from the barrel of a gun”, Mao used PLA as his own security guards to seize absolute power and forestall political uprising. This carried an inherent price. The PLA’s humiliating performance in the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War was a showcase of its entrenched weakness in morale, leadership, and most of all, combat readiness.
Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” policy in 1978 was essentially embedded in a security environment that favored China’s peaceful development. The scale and rapidity of China’s economic growth helped mobilize substantial resources to build up a modernized PLA with the accumulation of advanced aircrafts, sea vessels, and missiles. From 2000 to 2016, China’s military budget grew with an annual rate of roughly 10%, while only dropped to 5-7% in recent years. The military budget reached to $231 billion in 2024, compared to $22 billion in 2003. With this process of military boom emerged a paradox: a largely augmented military force that confronts no formidable external threat in presence.
How can we explain this paradox? For CCP, the main threat comes from the inside, especially the potential challenge to its legitimacy. CCP’s way of legitimacy-building is to forcefully assert the territorial claim on Taiwan. Put simply, CCP uses the Taiwan issue as an internal incentive to drive forward military modernization. Thus PLA serves double purposes in upholding CCP’s legitimacy and in thwarting the U.S. intervention in a possible confrontation over Taiwan. However, politics always prevails over combat effectiveness in PLA’s every aspect of operation: loyal personnel, centralized command, indoctrinated training, ideological research, non-war operations, and armaments with non-war utility. All these aspects must be optimized to shore up CCP’s total political control, rather than to construct a war machine capable of real combat.
For CCP, the best strategy regarding Taiwan is to use all possible means, military or non-military, to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, so a direct confrontation with the U.S. can be avoided. Hence, CCP practices patience, waiting for the best timing to make a favorable deal with the U.S. with regard to Taiwan. Before that kind of deal realizes, PLA’s main task is not to engage in a real confrontation with the U.S., but to ensure CCP’s totalitarian rule. Should such a confrontation becomes inevitable, the PLA would rely more on indirect methods and asymmetric warfare lest an all-out war break out.
What should American military planners do to with regard to the PLA threat? During the post-WWII era, the U.S. prepared itself more for an improbable great-power war, only to found itself more engaged in regional conflicts with lower intensity. Preparing for a conventional war with China brings benefits in upgrading military capabilities, buts runs the risk of overlooking urgent and immediate threats that may drag down not only the U.S., but also its allies and partners. In conclusion, the author suggests that the American policymakers may need to rethink its strategic framework and re-adjust its risk portfolios in order to reflect more precisely on the realities of the security environment.
As China’s civil grievances and social unrest brew along with a declining economy, CCP is growing more desperate to maintain its absolute power, at all costs and with all means. If CCP successfully brings Taiwan into China’s fold without firing a single shot, this historical achievement will solidify CCP’s legitimacy and further embolden CCP to harbor more territorial ambitions. It is absolutely imperative for the leaders of the U.S. and Taiwan to prevent that doomsday scenario from happening. To fulfill that task requires wisdom, courage, and determination.
The article is based on RAND Corporation’s “The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness: The People’s Liberation Army Remains Focused on Upholding Chinese Communist Party Rule, Not Preparing for War”, authored by Timothy R. Heath. Read the full report