Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping privately acknowledged or openly claimed that taking Taiwan back into the Chinese motherland’s fold is a mission to be accomplished. But no Communist China’s leader takes this mission more seriously than Xi Jinping. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) recently published a digital report that looks into the ways and means of blockade that China might apply to coerce Taiwan into negotiation or even surrender.
Faced with America’s formidable forces stationed in the West Pacific, direct invasion of Taiwan may not be a plausible choice. On the other side, quarantine may be an approach too mild to intimidate the truculent island into submission. As a result, the stand-in-between blockade makes more sense for PLA decision-makers. China’s National Defense University defines “joint blockade campaign” as “an offensive campaign that is implemented by navy, air force, second artillery and army campaign large formations with the assistive concerted efforts of the armed police force and militia . . . to sever enemy economic and military connections with the outside world.” This approach penetrates into Taiwan’s vulnerability in overreliance on international trade for markets of manufactured goods, and for sources of supply for food and fossil fuels.
Like all other military and non-military tactics, blockade carries inherent strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths lie in its feasibility, flexibility, and having a clear focus. By contrast, it runs the risks of escalating or protracting the conflicts, leaves Taiwan’s defense forces intact, and makes considerable room for deflecting or escaping the blockade. Given all these restraints, China might choose to scale up into a full invasion if the original blockade fails to produce the desired effects. The 2023 CSIS survey of experts found that a majority of experts bet China would seek to blockade rather than to invade.
Based on these analyses on China’s strategic calculus, the report unfolds three most possible scenarios in which China mobilizes and integrates PLA air force, air defense, naval aviation, army aviation, rocket forces, coastal forces, and support forces in order to establish dominance in key domains of information, maritime, and air.
Scenario 1: All-out Kinetic Blockade
The first scenario portrays a fully kinetic blockade, which relies on the effective control over the three key domains. The blockade is coupled with hard coercion like missile strikes and soft gestures like “noncombatant evacuation operations” (NEO). All these measures are scalable and stoppable, depending on whether Taiwan chooses to fight or capitulate. In addition, China employs non-military maneuvers, such as disinformation and sabotage, to demoralize Taiwanese and sink Taiwan government’s support. These maneuvers are also instrumental in promoting a proxy or a puppet government who favors a more obedienct stance with China.
Scenario 2: Mining Blockade
The second scenario begins with live-fire missile exercises, and proceeds with the so-called “special law enforcement operations” that identify and enforce air and maritime exclusion zones. Covert sea mine placement follows, along with cyber operations aimed to disrupt basic communication and transportation infrastructures. Maritime militia vessels are deployed in exclusion zones for purposes of surveillance and reconnaissance. Regular flies are conducted to enforce the no-fly zones. This tactic of partial blockade seeks to reduce Western opposition, avoids unexpected escalation of conflicts, while at the same time maintains constant pressure on Taiwan to submit to China’s negotiation terms.
Scenario 3: Limited Blockade
The third scenario witnesses similar operations and rules of engagement as the second scenario. The key difference is the lack of sea mining, which deters maritime vessels from entering exclusion zones, while punishes noncompliant ships. This tactic serves to present an international image of restraint so that more countries would be persuaded to remain neutral in the cross-strait conflict. However, this tactic makes PLA more vulnerable to America’s intervention and Taiwan’s counter responses.
Will a blockade on Taiwan generate the desirable outcome for China? The authors think the answer to this critical question depends upon Taipei’s determination to defend itself, Washington’s willingness to intervene, along with Beijing’s patience and perseverance. Therefore, we can fairly say that it’s always the most determined, either in a war of attrition or in a protracted conflict, who triumphs at last.
The article is based on CSIS’s digital report “How China Could Blockade Taiwan”, authored by Bonnie Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, and Truly Tinsley. Read the full report