“There has never been any doubt about the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons or their potential for terror……These weapons are unique, and a large part of their uniqueness derives from their being perceived as unique.” ~Thomas Schelling’s 2005 Nobel Prize lecture.

The apocalypse of mutual destruction in a nuclear showdown has kept the United States and the Soviet Union in restraint both in rhetoric and in reaction. As China is building up its second nuclear strike capability, it is of utmost importance to evaluate and control the nuclear risks in a probable confrontation between the U.S. and China over Taiwan. To address this critical issue, RAND Corporation just published a policy report that seeks to evaluate the associated risks and to provide suggestions to mitigate such risks, so that a nuclear catastrophe would be averted.

In the first chapter, the report has a historical review on the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenals. China accelerated the process in recent years through the buildup of DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS). The main goal is to develop a secure second strike capability. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2022 annual report to Congress on China’s military power, China is projected to possess a total number of 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. That number will reach 1,500 by 2035.

Under what occasions would China resort to the first use of nuclear weapons? According to PLA’s military textbook “The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns”, the conditions that could possibly provoke China to “lower the nuclear threshold” include conventional attacks on critical infrastructure, civilian nuclear infrastructure, and political/economic centers. China’s nuclear alertness can also be further raised by foreign attacks on domestic critical targets that result in the overturn of the “overall strategic situation”, such as China’s nuclear facilities or CCP’s high-rank officers. The U.S. side could also act as voluntary or involuntary sources that trigger China’s first use of nuclear arms. The first kind of provocation comes from actual or perceived U.S. long-range strike targeting entangled systems, CCP leaders, population centers or nuclear forces. The second kind of provocation originates from China’s preemptive attacks on bombers, weapons, or support elements of U.S. long-range strike forces.

The report sends a clear message to American policymakers: preparation for a future war with China demands factoring in nuclear escalation, which primarily features U.S. joint long-range kinetic strike against China or vice versa. In that kind of nuclear scenario, the threshold is unfixed, the signaling is unclear, while the rules of engagement are unpredictable. There is inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, to maintain the full range of intactness in military operational utility, force survivability, and escalation management.

What should American military planners do to alleviate such nuclear risks? The authors offer policy recommendations in capability-building, risk management, and nuclear de-escalation. Regarding capability-building, the U.S. should develop long-range strike denial capabilities that are supported by relevant structures and postures in order to maintain operational effectiveness, ensure force survivability, and forestall nuclear escalation. Regarding risk management, the U.S. should seek to shape China’s perception on America’s nuclear potency, incorporate nuclear factors into military acquisition, establish training programs in nuclear escalation, and design proper organizational structures capable of nuclear risk assessment. Regarding nuclear de-escalation, the U.S. should shield long-range strike facilities from China’s nuclear strike, avoid unwanted confrontation with other nuclear powers like Russia or North Korea, while formulate communication strategies and response plans for China’s nuclear signaling.

With almost all attention set on the economic and technological wars between the U.S. and China during the last two administrations, the nuclear factor is often neglected while a nuclear war is deemed as a remote possibility. American policymakers need to realize that the critical question is not whether China is determined to go to war with the U.S. on Taiwan, but whether the U.S. is determined to fight a war with China at the risk of nuclear escalation. It is absolutely imperative for the second Trump administration to demonstrate the will to protect Taiwan against China’s invasion, while simultaneously take great pains to steer the nuclear apocalypse away from the current and the next generation.

The article is based on RAND Corporation’s “Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold”, authored by Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Shawn Cochran Alexis Dale-Huang, David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Jeff Hagen Elliot Ji, William Kim, Nina Miller, and Cindy Zheng. Read the full report